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1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. INTRODUCTION. 
This suit was brought against the City of Boise ("the City") and its employee, Timothy 
I-iogland ("Hogland") by Boise Tower Associates, LLC ("BTA"). The foundation of BTA's case 
rests on the fraudulent assertion that the City's "permit revocation caused the financing, and 
hence the entire project, to fail." (App. Brief at 31.) Frederick Peterson, the managing member 
of BTA,' swore this statement was true. (R. p. 142, Exh. 3, Peterson Aff. 7 19; also see R. p. 9, 
Complaint 7 28). BTA has repeated the falsehood that its project's financing failed due to the 
City's permit revocation. 
These statements are fraudulent. Worse, the BTA's documents, which unequivocally 
prove these statements are false, were not disclosed to the City by BTA until after the City had 
filed its summary judgment and response to BTA's summary judgment. Simply put, the entire 
time the City was defending this lawsuit, BTA knew that any dispute concerning the permit did 
not cause Plaintiffs financing to fail. Indeed, BTA withheld the very documents which prove its 
revenue stream and funding prospects were available well after reinstatement of the building 
permit. By the time the documents were disclosed, it was too late for the City to challenge these 
matters through its pending Motion for Summary Judgment. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDING BELOW. 
BTA filed its complaint on November 2, 2004. Subsequently, the parties filed cross- 
motions for summary judgment. R. 46 and 54. After a hearing on April 26, 2007, the District 
Court filed its Decision and Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment on May 11,2007, 
granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. Judgment was filed on May 15, 2007. 
S e e  R. 142, Ex. 2, "Aff. of Fredrick Peterson," 7 1. 
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R. 79. Defendants timely moved for attorney's fees and costs. R. 102. The District Court filed 
its Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's [sic] Pefitionfor Allotvance ofAitorneys 
[sic] Fees and Costs on July 18, 2007, denying the Defendants' claims for fees, but awarding 
costs. R. 129. Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal on June 22, 2007. R. 120. A judglnent 
awarding costs was filed on July 30, 2007. R. 135. Defendants filed their Notice of Cross- 
Appeal as to that judgment on July 31,2007. R. 138. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
BTA filed its complaint in this case on November 2,2004. On March 30,2007 -two and 
a half years after filing the complaint and four days after the City's filing of its summary 
judgment motion and response - BTA dumped 109 pages of documents on the City which were 
never previously produced, although they had been requested in discovery (hereinafter referred 
to as the "Document Dump"). Those documents revealed BTA's substantial contacts with many 
lenders willing to j rnd the project after BTA's building permit was reinstated and nearly two 
dozen witnesses never disclosed by BTA. In the letter accompanying the Document Dump, 
BTA's counsel admits these documents "relate to some of [BTA's] contact with lenders in the 
time periods which are relevant to this case and to your discovery requests." (R. 143, Ex. 24, 
Muir Aff., Ex. I;.) 
1. Lenders Were At A11 Relevant Times Willing To Fund BTA's Proiect. 
a. Marshall Investments Corporation. 
According to BTA, Marshall Investments Corporation ("Marshall") was its "ace in the 
hole" for financing. BTA tells this Court - as it did the court below - that the revocation of the 
building permit led to "a withdrawal of fhrther financing efforts on the Project by Marshall" and 
that BTA "was never thereafter able to obtain alternative financing." (App. Brief pp. 9, 18.) 
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(emphasis added.) This statement is false. The Document Dump revealed that Marshall 
continued financing efforts until at least 11 weeks afier revocation and at least 21 days aftcr the 
April 8, 2003, veinstatement of the permit. On April 30, 2003, Marshall wrote that it was willing 
to consider financing the project "under the same terms and conditions set forth in [its] 
commitment to [BTA] dated January 10,2003" with the exception of five  change^.^ ((R. 143, Ex. 
12, Allen Aff,, Ex. H, BTA 08780) (emphasis added). 
b. Document Dump Revealed Many Other Financial Groups Working with 
BTA Despite Revocation. 
After the revocation of the building permit, several streams of financing in addition to 
Marshall were readily available to BTA, provided Appellant would agree to pay a customary 
application fee and put down a certain amount of equity, which BTA refused to do. Without 
belaboring the point on each lender, the City limits its discussion to the following three: Owens 
Investment Fund ("Owens"), Commercial Mortgage Investment Company ("CMI"), and WS&O, 
Ltd ("WS&O). 
(i) Owens Investment Fund 
The City was aware of Owens prior to the Document Dump, but not until after it 
supplemented discovery did BTA disclose that Owens, like Marshall, was willing to wait until 
after the permit issues had been resolved. These records revealed that on March 28,2003, Owens 
still "was very interested in providing [BTA] with a loan" and could fund the project within "30 
days or less from approval of building permit and payment of application fee." (R. 143, Ex. 12, 
Allen Aff., Ex. H, BTA 09265.) Owens was ready to "fly to Boise and conduct [its] final 
Two of Marshall's changes were highly beneficial to BTA in that they called for a reduction of 
residential presales from "53 units to 45 units" and a reduction in parking sales. (R. 143, Ex. 12, 
Allen Aff., Ex. H, BTA 08780.) 
RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPEALLANT'S BRIEF - 3 
underwriting." ~ d . ~  
(ii) Commercial Mortgage Investment Company 
The Document Dump disclosed CMI, a commerciaI lender never previously disclosed by 
BTA. CMI was willing to fund BTA in April and May of 2003. Immediately after receiving the 
Document Dump, the City contacted CMI's loan officer which BTA had not disclosed. In 2003 
J. Kim Powell, currently a principal at Summit Financial and Investment Group, LLC, worked 
for CMI as a loan officer. (R. 143, Ex. 14, Powell Aff. 1 2.) Powell has been in the commercial 
real estate lending business for 25 years and has funded over $4 billion worth of transactions. (Id. 
7 1.1 
At Peterson's request, Powell attempted to secure financing for BTA. (R. 143, Exh. 14, 
Powell Aff., 'f., 3). CMI was interested in the transaction and Peterson eventually signed a letter 
of intent (LOI). CMI was ready, willing, and able to fund the size of loan Peterson requested. Id. 
7 5. On May 8, 2003, Powell and Peterson met in the CMI offices in South Jordan, Utah. 
Peterson attempted to renegotiate the terms of the application and wanted CMI to waive the 
$25,000 application fee, even though Peterson had previously agreed to the loan terms and 
payment of the fee. Id. 'f., T 6-7. CMI agreed to spread the application fee out for Peterson by 
having $15,000 due at the time of execution of the application and $10,000 due when Peterson 
received a loan commitment acceptable to him in his sole discretion. Id. 7 9. Peterson never 
responded to Powell's final offer and concession. Id. CMI moved on to more fmitful projects. 
Id. 1 12. 
Powell explained the circumstances surrounding the building permit were never an issue 
or a barrier to funding with CMI. (R. 143, Exh., 14, Powell Aff., 'f., 1/10). Rather, the "barriers to 
The City deposed Peterson about Owens without the benefit of this document. Peterson did not 
disclose Owens' offer to fund the loan after the building permit was reinstated. 
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financing through CMI included the failure of Mr. Peterson to provide [CMI] with any 
meaningful documentation supporting his loan application, his unwillingness to pay an 
application fee, sign and execute the Loan Application, and his untenable attitude." Id, 7 1. 
Powell found Peterson "difficult to work with." Id. 7 8. Peterson never provided evidence of 
adequate cash equity. Id. 1 1. 
(iii) WS&O Ltd. 
The Document Dump also revealed another lender willing to finance the project- 
WS&O. On April 29, 2003, BTA sent a 5-page fax to Tom White of WS&O, which included 
"Purchase and Sales Info requested." (R. 143, Ex. 12, Allen Aff., Ex. H, BTA 09775).~ Several 
weeks later, a handwritten fax dated June 11, 2003; from Thomas E. White of WS&O to BTA 
stated: 
We have a verbal subject to inspection and terms and conditions. 
Lender & insurance co's will [be] on site in next two weeks. 
Tom 
You will hear verbally [sic] in next few days direct from lender 
(R. 143, Ex. 12, Allen Aff., Ex. H, BTA 09306.) It is evidence that in June 2003 - more fhun 
three molzths a$er the revocutio~ ofthe building permit - BTA obtained a verbal commitment 
for a loan from a lender who was willing to visit the site within two weeks. 
2. The Status of the Building Permit Was Not A Factor to the Lenders. 
Marshall, Owens, CMI and WS&O all agreed to extend financing to BTA without regard 
to the state of the building permit. On April 12, 2007 - 12 days after the Document Dump -the 
It should be noted that the late disclosure of this fax onlv included the cover page and not the 
attached information on ourchase and sales. Te City has made two written requests for these 
pages, without success. (R. p. 143, Exh. 24, Muir Aff., Exh. I1 and KK.) 
' Also not disclosed until March 30,2007. 
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City brought the documents to the attention of the district court in the City's Response Brief to 
BTA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 143, Ex. 13.) The Court did not believe it 
was able to rule on it or otherwise take it into consideration. R. 132-133. The City also advised 
BTA's counsel by letter dated April 13,2007, that the documents he had just produced showed 
without a doubt that BTA's allegations had no basis in fact or law and that the case was frivolous 
from the outset. (R. 143, Ex. 24, Muir Aff., Ex. H). Yet, BTA continues to pursue this case. 
3. In a Separate Federal Case, BTA Sued For the Same Damages for Claims 
Arising over a Year Before Permit Revocation. 
On March 5, 2003, BTA (using the same lawyers) filed a lawsuit in federal district court 
against lender Washington Capital Management, et, al. ("wcM).~ By its own admission, the 
federal case involved claims which arose "over a year before" the permit revocation and the 
damages "arise from the failure of the project and are essentially the same as the damages sought 
in this case." (R. 142, Ex. 1, Mem. Supp. Mot. Stay, pp. 4,6.) 
In May of 1997, BTA and the Capital City Development Corporation ("CCDC") entered 
into a Disposition and Development Agreement ("DDA") for the development and construction 
of the Boise Tower Project. This project was located at 8'h Street and Main Street in downtown 
Boise. (R. 9, Compl. r/ 7.) Under the DDA, the project site would be conveyed to BTA upon 
submittal of financing commitments and proof of BTA's acceptance of a loan commitment. Id. 
at r/ 9. 
In 2001, BTA provided CCDC with a $29,000,000 construction financing loan 
commitment (dated October 10, 2001) from Washington Capital Management, Inc. (WCM). (R. 
9, Compl. 7 10.) As a result, in November of 2001, CCDC conveyed fee simple title of the 
~ o i s e  Tower Associates v. Washington Capital, et al., No. 03-141-S-MHW (Dist. Idaho, Sept. 
30,2005). 
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Project Site to BTA. (R. 9, Compl. 7 11 .) That same month, a major problem developed with the 
WCM loan commitment. (R. 142, Ex. 6, Bilyeu Aff. Ex. A p. 29, L1 10-16.) The loan did not 
close. Id. 
On September 30, 2005, in an affidavit filed in federal court, Peterson swore under oath, 
"As a result of WCM's refusal to close the construction loan on the terms of the Loan 
Commitment, the Project was never built and BTA suffered damages in excess of $1 9 million.. . . 
UTA, to date, has been unable to procure alternative financing." (R. 143, Ex. 8, Aff. of Counsel, 
Ex. B, 77 6-7.) The statement that BTA could not secure alternative financing is factually false. 
However, the Peterson affidavit proves that the dispute with the City of Boise concerning the 
permit did not cause the damages BTA sought in the present lawsuit. If Peterson's affidavit 
which was used to obtain relief in the federal litigation is accurate, these damages were caused 
by WCM. 
4. PDS Director Ho~land Assists BTA to Overcome Aaulication and Permit 
Problems. 
During the pendancy of the federal lawsuit against WCM, BTA filed the suit against the 
City of Boise and Boise City Planning and Development Services (PDS") Director Timothy 
Hogland, accusing him of causing BTA's financing to fail. UTA accuses him of having criminal 
intent in this dealings with Appellant. (App. Brief at 33, 35). The facts show that at all times 
Hogland was simply a public employee who went to considerable lengths to help BTA make its 
project work. 
a. Hogland Extended the Building Permit Application at BTA 's Request. 
On November 27, 1998, BTA submitted a building permit application ("Application") to 
PDS. (R. 142, Ex. 9, Hogland Aff. 7 2.) 
On December 17, 1999, a letter from PDS notified BTA that its Application had expired. 
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Id. 7 3. Pursuant to the 1994 U.B.C. 5 107.4, applications expire after 180 days if no building 
permit is issued. (R. 142, Ex. 2, Burke Aff., Ex. A, Depo. Ex. 46.) 
Afer the application had expired, BTA requested a meeting with Hogland and PDS staff 
members imploring Hogland to utilize "working days" rather than "calendar days" in order to 
extend the application. Hogland agreed to use "working days" to "recalculate" the Application's 
expiration date. This resulted in extending the Application through May 5, 2000. (R. 142, Ex. 9, 
Hogland Aff. 7 4.) 
b. Hogland Extended the Building Permit a Second Time. 
On May 3, 2000, two days prior to the second expiration deadline of the Application, 
BTA took out Building Permit No. BLD98-032705 ("Permit") for shell and core construction. Id. 
7 5. Because no building or work started within 180 days of issuance of the Permit, as required 
by the UBC 5 106.4.4, BTA asked for an extel~sion of the Permit. Id. 7 6. On October 5, 2000, 
PDS extended the Permit through June 14, 2001. Id On June 13, 2001, BTA requested and 
received inspection of work. Id. 7 7. 
c. The Correction Notice Addressed Safely Issues. 
All parties agree that sometime in May of 2002, work was halted at the site. PDS's 
records showed work on the site had halted on May 3,2002 -the last time an inspector from the 
City had inspected work in progress. (R. 142, Ex. 9, Hogland Aff. 7 8.) According to PDS, the 
building permit expired November 3, 2002. Hogland was unaware that any further construction 
had taken place. Id. 
On the afternoon of Thursday, November 7, 2002, Hogland received a letter from M.A. 
Mortenson, BTA's construction contixctor, claiming that work would commence that day.7 Id. 7 
Peterson claims that he had an agreement with Mortenso~~ onOctober 25, 2002. Mortenson, 
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9. The following day, the City's inspector, George Slane, issued a Correction Notice ("Notice") 
informing BTA that the site was to remain "as is" until PDS could meet with the owner and 
agree on a course of action. Id. at Ex. F 
As explained in paragraph 10 of Hogland's Affidavit, PDS was concerned about the 
safety of the BTA construction site because it was an open pit in middle of downtown Boise. 
PDS considered it a hazard. BTA again implored PDS to recalculate the expiration date based 
upon working days. Because there was an open site with hazardous conditions, PDS would not 
consider using working days. Hogland was concerned and took the action solely in response to 
the hazard that existed by reason of the open excavation site of the Boise Tower Project and the 
fact that BTA's permit had expired. His actions were intended to address the significant risk to 
the general public and the buildings adjacent to the site, given the width and depth of the 
excavated pit and exposed reinforcing bar, foundation, and concrete columns. (R. 142, Ex. 9, 
Hogland Aff. 1 10) 
d. Uoghnd Suggests a Stipulation As a Means To Keep the Project Alive. 
The following week, on November 13, 2003, Hogland met with BTA representatives 
relating to the expiration of the permit. (R. 142, Ex. 9, Hogland Aff. 1 11; Ex. 10, Burrows- 
Johnson Aff., Ex. A, p. 7, L. 24-29.) BTA insisted that an inspection had occurred on May 15, 
2002, which would extend the permit to November 11, 2002. Hogland did not have verification 
of the inspection. Inexplicably, BTA did not supply the inspection to Hogland at that time? (R. 
142, Ex. 9, Hogland Aff. 7 11.) 
however, explained by way of letter to PDS that the agreement was as of the afternoon of 
November 7,2002. (R. 142, Ex. 9, Hogland Aff., EX. E.) 
Although PDS did receive the May 15,2002, MTI inspection report on May 22,2002, Hogland 
did not see it until after the stipulation was signed. (R. 142, Ex. 9, Hogland Aff., 7 14; Ex. 10, 
Burrows-Johnson Aff., Ex. A, p. 7, L1.23-24.) 
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As a way to resolve the disagreement over the expiration date, Iiogland offered Peterson 
a stipulation on November 13, 2002, that would require BTA to take concrete steps to advance 
the construction. If work did not progress, the current permit would expire and Peterson would 
need to reapply for a permit. Peterson first signed and delivered the Stipulation to PDS on 
November 15, 2002. R. 142, Ex. 9, Hogland Aff. 1 12, Ex. 13. After signing, Peterson met with 
his attorney. Communicating through counsel, he requested revisions to the Stipulation. Id. at 7 
12; R. 142, Ex. 10, Burrows-Johnson Aff., Ex. A, p. 7, L1. 40-41. Peterson spoke with his 
attorney several times regarding the stipulation during the final meeting with PDS. (R. 142, Ex. 
i 10, Burrows-Johnson Aff.? Ex. A, p. 18, L1. 19-26.) As a result, the Stipulation was revised and 
again signed by Peterson and Hogland on November 19,2002, (R. 142, Ex. 9, Hogland Aff., Ex. 
I 
I 
I 1.) It should be noted that Hogland had no reason, other than to be accommodating, to allow 
I Peterson to change the Stipulation which Peterson had originally signed and delivered on 
November 15. 
The final stipulation required, in the pertinent part: 
1. That if of the conditions Iisted below are not met and 
maintained as outlined in this agreement, the current Building 
Permit (BLD 98-03075) will be expired and a new application and 
construction documents will be required to be submitted and 
approved reflecting the applicable code requirements of the 2000 
International Building Code. Or in the alternative, the property 
shall be restored to a status acceptable to the City. 
(R. 142, Ex. 9, Hogland Aff., Ex. I, 7 1) (underline in original). The stipulation also required 
BTA to post a bond or irrevocable letter of credit sufficient to cover restoration of the project site 
to its original state in the event the project was abandoned; that BTA designate an engineer and 
architect of record who would confirm that the conditions of the site had not deteriorated and 
future development was possible. The Stipulation addressed the construction scheduled by 
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stating "this project shall be completed in approximately two years from the date that funding is 
obtained." See Id., Hogland Aff. Ex. I, 77 2 - 7. In addition to the foregoing, the stipulation 
required the BTA to monitor structural issues on existing buildings adjacent to the site and report 
to the City and engage in other activities necessary to proceed with construction, including 
submitting final plans to the City. See Id,, Hogland Aff., Ex. I, f/fj 9 - 13. The Stipulation further 
provided: 
8. The BTA must provide a letter from a lending institution 
indicating a comn~itment of full financing for this project less the 
equity of BTA in the project. This commitment letter shall meet 
the approval of the City. The commitment letter must be received 
within 60 days of the date of this Agreement. 
Id., Hogland Aff., Ex. I, 1 8. Finally, the Stipulation provided that the terms and conditions of the 
Stipulation were in addition to any building code requirements; that BTA would hold the City 
harmless for any damages resulting from the Stipulation; and that the Stipulation would 
terminate once funding acceptable to the City was obtained by BTA. See Id., Ifogland Aff., Ex. I, 
The Stipulation kept the permit alive. Peterson has admitted that it enabled BTA to 
continue with "a lot of consiruction at that time." (R. 142, EX. 8, Bilyeu Aff., Ex. A, p. 54, L1. 3- 
1 I.) At no time during this period did Peterson or BTA's legal counsel complain to PDS that the 
stipulation was "illegal." (R. 142, Ex. 9, Hogland Aff., 7 13, Ex. E.) 
e. BTA Requests, and Hogland Agrees, to an Extension to the Stipulation. 
BTA did not meet the deadline in the Stipulation. Id. at f/ 14. BTA requested Hogland 
give it an extension. In direct contrast to BTA's accusation that Peterson had "criminal intent," 
Peterson admitted Hogland "was willing" to agree to another extension. (R. 142, Ex. 8, Bilyeu 
Aff., Ex. A, p. 54, L1. 13-17.) On January 22, 2003, Hogland and BTA agreed to an 
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addendumlextension of the Stipulation until February 4, 2003. (R. 142, Ex. 9, Hogland Aff., Ex. 
J.) 
f. The Permit Expired Because BTA Failed to Meet Extension Deadline of 
the Stipulation. 
BTA failed to meet the two-week extension. Id at 7 15. On February 1 I, 2003, Hogland 
sent BTA a letter confirming the expiration of the Permit in accordance with the Stipulation. (R. 
142, Exh. 9, Hogland Aff., Ex. L). 
g. Appeal and Hearings Before the City Council. 
BTA filed an appeal of the Permit's expiration. On April 1, 2003, less than 60 days after 
the permit expired, the City Council held a hearing to consider the BTA appeal. (R. 142, Ex. 10, 
Bunows-Johnson Aff., Ex. A.) B'IA had an opportunity to present testimony and offer evidence. 
Peterson, his attorney, Eric Rossman, and Chuck Rowe (an M.A. Mortensen representative) 
testified. Id, PDS also presented testimony and evidence. BTA was provided opporl~lnily to 
rebut. The City Council deferred its decision until the following week. Id. at Ex. B. 
h. Permit Reinstated by Boise City of Council. 
On April 8, 2003, the City Council decided to reinstate BTA's Permit. (R. 142, Ex. 10, 
Bunows-Johnson Aff., Ex. B.) The development has been sold by Peterson to Charter House 
Group. (R. 142, Ex. 8, Aff. of Counsel, Ex. A, pp. 320-323.) The Permit is still active at this 
time, 
11. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard for this Court's review of a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment is the same standard as used by the trial court in ruling on the original motion. 
Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC. ,  140 Idaho 354,360,93 P.3d 685,691 (2004). A party 
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is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). "When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response . . . must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
Should this Court find the decision of the lower court to be based on an erroneous theory, 
the Court will nonetheless uphold the lower court's decision if any alternative legal basis can be 
found to support it. Marfel v. Bulotti, 138 Idaho 451, 454-55, 65 P.3d 192, 195-96 (2003). In 
doing so, "[tlhis Court may apply the law to undisputed facts de novo." Id., 138 Idaho at 455. 
111. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I?. WHETHER RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT 
TO IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 54(E)(1), 42 U.S.C. 1988, AND/OR 
IDAHO CODE 5 5  6-918A and 12-117. 
G. WHETHER RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO APPELLATE RULES 41 AND 11.1, IDAHO RULE OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 54(E)(1), 42 U.S.C. 5 1988, AND/OR IDAHO CODE 35 6-918A 
AND 12-117. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THERE WAS NO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS VIOLATION. 
In order to invoke 5 1983, a plaintiff must show a violation of a right secured by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was 
committed by a person acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. 5 1983; Aberdeen- 
Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82,92,982 P.2d 9 17,927 (1999). 
In this case, BTA argues that "[tlhe constitutional rights that were deprived by the City 
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and Hogland were BTA's rights to procedural due process." Appellant's Brief at 12. "In order 
to establish a procedural due process claim under 5 1983, [the plaintiffj must allege first that it 
has a property interest as defined by state law, and, second, that the defendants, acting under 
color of state law, deprived it of that property interest without constitutionally adequate process." 
PFZProperfies, Znc. V. Rodriquez, 928 F.2d 28,30 (1'' Cir. 1991). 
1. Plaintiff Did Not Possess A Proaertv Right in the Building Permit. 
Property interests me not created by the Constitution, but are created by and stem from, 
an independent source such as state law. Bd. of Regents v. Rotlt, 408 U.S .  564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 
2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must 
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation 
of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id. A reasonable 
expectation of entitlement is determined largely by the language of the statute and the extent to 
which the entitlement is couched in mandatory terms. See Wedgesnedges of Cat. v. City of 
Phoenix, 24 F3d. 56 (9" Cir. 1994). 
In the context of decisions relating to the application of zoning ordinances, including the 
approval of plats or the grantlng of permits, courts have held that federal courts, applying federal 
law such as 42 U.S.C. $1983, should refrain from being involved in decisions concerning the 
approval or denial of local licenses or permits. See Gardner v. Baltimore Mayor and City 
Council, supra; Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach, 48 Cal. App. 4Ih 1152, 56 Cal Rptr. 2d. 223 
(1996). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the issue of when an individual would 
possess a property right to a state-issued license or permit in a number of contexts. In Jacobson 
v. Hannifen, 627 F2d. 177 (9" Cir. 1980), the court found the Plaintiff did not possess a 
protectable property interest in obtaining a new gaming license as the governing statute did not 
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contain mandatory language which restricted the regulatory agency's discretion to deny a license 
to someone who claimed to meet minimum eligibility criteria. Id. at 180. The focus upon the 
enabling legislation and the discretion granted governmental officials was applied in the context 
of a zoning application in Batteson v. Geisse, 857 F2d. 1300 (9th Cir. 1988) with the court ruling 
that in the absence of any significant restrictions on the City Council's discretion and powers, a 
property interest did not arise in the approval or denial of a plat application. 
Applying these principles, to determine whether an entitlement or a property interest 
exists, the focus must be upon whether the legislation which regulates the permitting process 
provides the government officials with discretion to attach condition to the permit or, 
alternatively, approve or deny the permit outright. As noted in Gardner, "whether a property 
holder possesses a claim of entitlement to a permit or approval turns on whether, under state and 
municipal law, the local agency lacks all discretion to deny issuance of the permit or to withhold 
its approval." See Gardner, 969 F2d. at 68 (italics in original). "Even if in a particular case, 
objective observers would estimate that the probability of issuance was extremely high, the 
opportunity of the local agency to deny issuance suffices to defeat the existence of a federally 
protected property interest." Id. (Quoting RRI Realfy Corp. v. Village of South Hampton, 870 
F2d. 911, 918 (2nd Cir. 1989). The focus is upon the enabling legislation and whether the 
relevant statute, ordinance, or building code provides the local authorities with the discretion to 
issue the permit. If substantial discretion exists, a property right does not arise. 
w
The UBC requires, as part of the submission process, "[pllans, specifications, engineering 
calculations, diagrams, soil investigation reports, special inspection and structural observations 
programs and other data . . .." R. 142, Ex. 2 "Aff. of Christopher Burke," Ex. A, Ex. 46 ("UBC"), 
5 106.3.2. Thereafter: 
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The application, plans, specifications, computations and other data 
filed by an applicant for a permit shall be reviewed by the building 
official. Such plans niay be reviewed by other departments of this 
jurisdiction to verify compliance with any applicable laws under 
their jurisdiction. If the building official finds that the work 
described in an application for a permit and the plans, 
specifications and other data filed therewith conform to the 
requirements of this code and other pertinent laws and ordinances, 
and that the fees specified in Section 107 have been paid, the 
building official shall issue a permit therefor to the applicant. 
Id., UBC $ 106.4.1. However: 
Id. 
The building official may issue a permit for the construction of 
part of a building or structure before the entire plans and 
specifications for the whole building or structure have been 
submitted or approved, provided adequate information and detailed 
statements have been filed complying with all pertinent 
requirements of this code. The holder of a partial permit shall 
proceed without assurance that the permit for the entire building or 
structure will be granted. 
In this case, BTA did not submit all plans, calculations and drawings. Instead, BTA was 
operating under a partial permit. Because the UBC only provides that such permits "may" be 
issued, the decision to do so is discretionary. See Crown v. State, 127 Idaho 175, 898 P.2d 1086 
(1995) ("the use of the term 'may' was dispositive in showing the discretionary nature of the 
decision."). As provided at UBC $106.4.1, "The holder of a partial permit (BTA) shall proceed 
without assurance that the permit for the entire building or structure will be granted." Simply 
stated, the UBC does not attempt to limit the City's discretion to issue a full permit or require 
conditions be met prior to the issuance of a permit to construct the building. Thus, under the 
circumstances of this case, BTA had no property right in the building permit. For that reason, 
BTA relies on 3883 Connecticut LLC v. District of Coluinbia, 336 F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2003), 
in focusing on the revocation. However, that case is silent on whether a final permit would 
necessarily follow, or if there was discretion as to issuing a final permit. In this case, the UBC is 
clear that the partial permit is discretionary and there is no guarantee that a final permit will be 
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its constitutionaI claims fail. 
2. The Citv Did Not Infringe Upon Any Propertv Right That Mav Have Existed 
Even assuming that BTA had a property right in the limited building permit, there was no 
deprivation of that right under the facts of this case. Although there was a stop-work order 
(SWO) issued for a short time until additional safeguards were agreed upon concerning 
completion of the project and inspection of the foundation and lateral support of surrounding 
land, the building permit was never actually revoked. See Cathedral Church of the Intercessor 
v. Village of Meh~erne, 353 F. Supp. 2d 375, 386-87 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that SWOs were 
not property deprivations where they were "only temporary suspensions from which the 
Plaintiffs could get relief by satisfying the Village's conditions."). Were, the SWO issued by the 
City was a temporary action. For that reason, the Appellant's constitutional claims are without 
merit. 
3. BTA Was Given Sufficient Due Process. 
This court has stated that "[plrocedural due process requires that there must be some 
process to ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the 
state or federal constitutions." Cowan v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 143 Idaho 501, 5 10, 148 P.3d 1247, 
1256 (2006) (quoting Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., supra, 133 Idaho at 91). This 
requirement is met when a party is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 133 Idaho at 91. "The opportunity to be heard must occur at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner in order to satisfy the due process requirement." Id. 
issued. Thus, this situation is similar to that of a teacher whose hiring is discretionary, but also 
lacks renewable contract status. A teacher in such circumstances has been held to not have a 
property right in his or her continued employment. See Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Disf. No. 2, 
128 Idaho 714, 723, 918 P.2d 583, 592 (1996). Similarly, a builder that has a partial permit 
issued at the City's discretion and no gumantee of receiving a final permit should have not 
property rights attached to having a building permit. 
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(internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, "[dlue process is not a concept to be applied 
rigidly in every matter. Rather, it is a flexible concept calling for such procedural protections as 
are warranted by the particular situation." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The United States Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a pre-deprivation hearing is 
required in all cases. Parratl v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540-41, (1981). Interim suspensions of 
licenses and temporary seizures of property may be undertaken without a pre-deprivation 
hearing, provided there is sufficient factual basis for the action and that prompt administrative or 
judicial review of the merits of the decision is available. See Barry v. Burchi, 443 U.S.  55, 64, 
(1979). Moreover, an informal meeting with the decision-maker is sufficient to satisfy due 
process. Weinberg v. Whatcom County, 241 F.3d 746,753 (9'h Cis. 2001). 
BTA argues that a pre-deprivation process was required; i.e., that it should have been 
given a hearing prior to the issuance of the stop-work order (SWO). This issue was addressed in 
3883 Connecticut LLC v. District of Columbia, 336 F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2003), a case heavily 
relied on in BTA's brief. See Appellant's Brief at 13-14. In that case, a developer obtained 
permits to begin construction work on an apartment building. The District of Columbia 
subsequently issued a SWO in the midst of the initial stages of construction without first 
providing a pre-deprivation hearing. The plaintiff argued that "the procedure to challenge a SWO 
is constitutionally infirm because it does not guarantee a hearing before the SWO can issue." 
3883 Connecticut LLC, 336 F.3d at 1074. The court rejected that argument reasoning that the 
District of Columbia had a "significant interest in maintaining its capability to act swiftly to 
bring an immediate halt to construction work that poses a threat to public health and safety or to 
the environment." Id. The court also found that because "the regulations provide for expedited 
post-deprivation review before two District officials and then immediate appeal to the District 
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Board of Appeals and Review-a procedure that reduces thc risk of protracted harm from a 
wrongly-issued order," "these protections meet the requirements of due process." Id. See also 
Licari v. Ferruzzi, 22 F.3d 344, 348 (1'' Cis. 1994) (holding that in revocation of building 
permits, plaintiffs procedural due process rights were not violated because "postdeprivation 
remedies were available"). 
Under the UBC, Prmits automatically expire "if the building or work authorized by such 
permit is suspended or abandoned at any time after the work is commenced for a period of 180 
days." UBC 5 106.4.4. This period may be extended for up to 180 days "on written request by 
the permittee," but "[nlo permit shall be extended more than once." Id. 
Here, Hogland believed that no work had been done on the project for more than 180 
days.I0 Thus, from Hogland's perspective, the building permit had automatically expired. See R. 
142, Ex. 2 "Aff. of Christopher Burke," Ex. A, "Hogland Depo.," p. 133, L1. 8-17; p. 138, L1. 21- 
22; p. 141, LI. 6-8. The expiration was not caused by any regulatory decision or action by the 
City. Instead, BTA had failed to advance the project. Moreover, there was a concern that 
because of the Long period of time during which the project had sat idle, conditions at the 
construction site had deteriorated resulting in possible health and safety issues. As addressed in 
the Stipulation, these included rusting of steel bars and beams, in addition to the lateral support 
for surrounding property. See also R. 142, Ex. 9, Hogland Aff. 7 10 (discussing safety concerns 
with pit and exposed structural materials); R. 142, Ex. 2 "Aff. of Christopher Burke," Ex. A, 
"Hogland Depo.," p. 131, L. 15 - p. 132, L. 11 (discussing other public safety issues, including 
an incident where two women accidentally entered the work-site and were trapped). 
lo Even then, the work performed was minimal-"equivalent to nailing a few nails on a house." 
See R. 142, Ex. 2 "Aff. of Christopher Burke," Ex. A, "Hogland Depo.," p. 127, L1. 12-21. 
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In any event, BTA was given a prompt opportunity to be heard. The stop-work order" 
was issued on November 8, 2002, and directed BTA to cease work until there had been a 
meeting with Planning and Development. See R. 142, Ex. 2 "Aff. of Christopher Burke," Ex. A, 
"Hogland Depo.," Ex. 59. A meeting was held the following day-November 9, 2002. See R. 
142, Ex. 2 "Aff. of Clvistopher Burke," Ex. A, "Hogland Depo.," p. 144, L. 19 - p. 145, L. 22. A 
proposed Stipulatioll was discussed, and a draft may have been prepared and presented to BTA. 
Id., p. 145, L. 20 - p. 146, L. 4. At the meeting, BTA failed to provide any documentation to 
refute the fact the 180-day period had expired. Id., p. 146, L. 5 - p. 147, L. 1. In short, there was 
only a 1-day delay between the time the SWO was issued and when BTA was given its first 
opportunity to be heard. 
The BTA could have appealed the SWO to the building code committee or the City 
Council. See R. 142, Ex. 2 "Aff. of Christopher Burke," Ex. A, "Hogland Depo.", p. 155, L1. 9 - 
18 and Ex. 46, UBC 5 105. Instead, BTA (with the assistance of legal counsel) proposed changes 
to the Stipulation and entered into a revised Stipulation on November 19, 2002. At that point, 
construction was allowed to resume. Thus, BTA negotiated and volu~~tarily entered into a 
modification of the terms and conditions of its building permit rather than use the procedure 
available to it to appeal the SWO. BTA cannot now complain of the lack of due process when it 
chose to forego the procedures that were available. See Ferguson v. Bd. of Trustees, 98 Idaho 
359,366, 564 P.2d 971,978 (1977) (teacher waived right to due process hearing when he left the 
hearing early). 
" The City issued its directive to stop work via a "Correction Notice." See R. 142, Ex. 2 "Aff. of 
Christopher Burke," Ex. A, "Hogland Depo.," Ex. 59. Thus, that directive is variously referred to 
as a correction notice or stop-work order throughout the record. 
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Subsequently, BTA violated the terms of the Stipulation by not adhering to deadlines 
relating to financing. See R. 142, Ex. 9, Hogland Aff., 7 14. Although BTA argues that "[nlone 
of these mectings [i.e., those in November 20021 provided BTA with an opportunity to oppose 
the ultimate revocation of its permit when Hogland concluded that the two loan commitments 
presented on January 21, 2003 were insufficient," Appellant's Brief at 16, the facts establish that 
the parties did confer and, on January 22, 2003, Hogland and the BTA agreed to an two-week 
extension. See R. 142, Ex. 9, Hogland Aff., Ex. J. After BTA failed to meet the new deadline, 
Hogland informed it the Permit had expired. Id. at 15 and Ex. L. 
BTA also argues that had it "been given an opportunity to be heard prior to the revocation 
of its permit, it could have shown that the City's building code does not allow the building 
official to revoke an existing building permit for failure to present proof of financing." 
Appellant's Brief at 16. This argument fails for two reasons. First, as noted above, BTA had an 
"opportuniiy to be heard" and to request an extension. If BTA failed to raise its legal objection, 
that was a decision by BTA rather than the lack of an opportunity to be heard. Second, whether 
the UBC permitted a condition that required proof of financing was moot in January 2003 
because BTA had waived its rights to appeal the SWO, choosing instead to enter into a 
Stipulation adding the condition requiring it to provide proof of financing. 
BTA subsequently appealed Mr. Hogland's determination to the City Council. A hearing 
took place on April 1, 2003. BTA was represented by counsel at the hearing and was allowed to 
present evidence and argument to the Council. See R. 142, EX. 10, Burrows-Johnson Aff., Ex. 
A. On April 8, 2003, the City Council reinstated BTA's Permit. See R. 142, Ex. 10, Burrows- 
Johnson Aff., Ex. B. In other words, BTA had a full and fair opportunity to be heard and, in fact, 
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prevailed. These facts show BTA was afforded all procedural due process required by the federal 
constitution. The district court correctly dismissed the due process claims. 
4. BTA Did Not Suffer the Harm It Claims. 
Throughout its briefing, BTA contends that the issuance of the SWO in November 2002 
and subsequent hearings on whether the Permit had expired caused it to lose financing. For 
instance, in support of its argument for a pre-deprivation hearing, BTA contends that "[tlhe 
revocation of the building permit and the adverse publicity surrounding it led to the cancellation 
of presale condominium agreements and the withdrawal of further financing efforts by the 
Marshall." Appellant's Brief at 18. BTA further contends that because of this, it has suffered 
damages in excess of $12 million. Id. 
BTA's contention is pure fiction. Through the "Document Dump", BTA produced 
relevant materials from its lenders which showed that one lender, Marshall, continued financing 
efforts until at least 11 weeks afler revocation and at least 21 days after the April 8, 2003, 
reinstatement of the permit. See R. 143, Ex. 12, Allen Aff. Ex. H, BTA 08780 (April 30, 2003, 
letter from Marshall Investments Corp. offering to move forward with a loan commitment of 
$40,600,000.00 with changes more favorable to BTA). In addition, BTA had other financers 
willing to provide the necessary financing. See, e.g., id., Ex. H ,  Bates 08388 (March 26, 2003 
letter from Unique Property Development offering to finance project as part of joint venture); 
Ex. H, Bates 09267 (May 7, 2003, letter from Storm Consultants reporting loan commitment for 
up to $30,000,000); Ex. H, Bates 09282 (May 9,2003 letter from Unique Property Development 
revising the prior March offer to finance the project); Ex. H, Bates 09316 (June 2, 2003 letter 
from Unique Property Development expressing continued interest and wanting "to get to the 
point where we have an agreement in principle..."). Contrary to BTA's representations, the 
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Document Dump revealed that any financing problems BTA experienced were not caused by the 
SWO or the building permit but, instead, were caused by BTA's recalcitrant stance toward 
paying application and tending fees. See, e.g,, R. 143, Ex. 12, Allen Aff. Ex. H, BTA 08251 
(April 24,2003, letter from AMS Commercial, LLC, stating that "it appears that the conversation 
[with CMI] bogged down on the topic of the $25,000 fee"); Ex. H, BTA 08256 (May 14,2003 
letter from BTA asking for waiver of $25,000 fee); Ex. H, Bates 08324 (May 16, 2003 letter 
from AMS Commercial, LLC, noting that but for the dispute over the $25,000 fee, "the loan 
could have probably been closed by now."). In short, the business records and documents 
produced by BTA in discovery show that Marshall was still interested in financing the project as 
late as April 30, 2003; and that BTA had other financiers interested in the project months after 
the April 2003 City Council hearing. There is no evidence that the issues surrounding the 
building permit caused BTA to lose its financing. 
B. BTA HAS WAIVED ANY ARGUMENTS AS TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
PROCESS. 
As noted earlier, BTA argues that "[tlhe constitutional rights that were deprived by the 
City and Hogland were BTA's rights to procedural due process." Appellant's Brief at 12. BTA 
has not made any arguments as to whether the Respondents violated its substantive due process 
rights. Accordingly, any such arguments are waived." See Tlzornas v. Medical Ctr. Physicians, 
P.A., 138 Idaho 200,205-206,61 P.3d 557,562-63 (2002). 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT C0KKECTL.Y DEI'EHMISED THAT TfIE CITY WAS 
NOT LIAB1.E FOR H0GLANI)'S ACTIONS UNDER A RESPONDEAT 
SUPERIOR THEORY. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that, in enacting 5 1983, "Congress did not 
l2 In any event, the substantive due process claim would have been pre-empted because of the 
takings claim. See N Pacifica, LLC v. Ci@ of Pacifica, 234 F .  Supp. 2d 1053, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 
2002) (citing cases). 
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intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official policy of some nature 
caused a constitutional tort." MonelI v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 
(1978). Thus, "a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in 
other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under 3 1983 on a vespondeat superior theory." 
Id. (italics in original). "Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, 
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent 
official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under 3 1983." 
Id., 436 U.S. at 694. See also Sprague v. City of Burley, I09 Idaho 656, 661, 710 P.2d 566,571 
(1985). See also Rosenbaum v. City & County of Sun Francisco, 484 F.3d 1 142,1155 (9" Cir. 
2007). 
BTA argues that Hogland was the final policy maker.I3 See Appellant's Brief at 20 - 26. 
BTA makes no argument that the actions complained of were long-term practices or policies 
adopted by the City, or that Hogland was a subordinate whose decisions were ratified by the final 
policy maker. Id. Thus, BTA has waived the latter arguments if they were ever applicable. See 
Thomas v. Medical Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200,205-206,61 P.3d 557, 562-63 (2002). 
Consequently, the narrow issue before this Court is whether under state law, did Hogland possess 
final policymaking authority? 
Whether a particular official has final policymaking authority is a question of state law 
and a legal question to be resolved by the trial judge. Jell v. Dallas Independent Sch. Dist., 491 
U.S.  701 (1989). "State law," in this context, includes valid local ordinances and regulations. St. 
Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 1 12, 125 (1988). 
l3 This argument is at odds with BTA's opening argument which suggests Hogland exceeded his 
authority under the UBC. See Appellant's Brief at 11. Apparently, BTA is attempting to argue 
that Hogland was both a final policyinaker, but also subject to limitations under a building code 
imposed on him by a higher authority. 
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When the decision of an official can be appealed to another, higher officer or body, that 
official is not a policymaker. 
When an official's discretionary decisions are constrained by 
policies not of that official's making, those policies, rather than the 
subordinate's departures from them, are the act of the municipality. 
Similarly, when a subordinate's decision is subiect to review by 
the municipality's auth-e 
authority to measure the official's conduct for conformance with 
their policies. 
Praprofnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 
F.3d 587, 602 (6" Cir. 2008) (holding a police official that issued a charge of discipline against 
an officer was not a policy maker, because the discipline could and was appealed to the police 
chief). Moreover, the courts have been careful to distinguish between decision-making authority 
and policymaking authority. That an official may have been delegated decision-making authority 
does not mean that he or she had been delegated the status of policymaker, much less final 
policymaker. Gelin v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 456 F.3d 525, 529-30 (5" Cir. 2006). "That 
a particular agent is the apex of a bureaucracy makes the decision 'final' but does not forge a link 
between 'finality' and 'policy."' Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397,400 (7th Cir. 1992). 
As noted by the District Court, the Plaintiff's sole evidence and argument for respondeat 
superior liability was that Hogland is employed by the City as the Director of Planning and 
Development Services and that duties were delegated to him relating to the enforcement of the 
Uniform Building Code ("UBC"). See Decision and Order, R. at 86. The duties and authority of 
the Director of PDS is set out in Boise City Code 8 3-05-02. However, as the District Court 
pointed out in its Decision and Order, Boise City Code $ 3-05-02 only grants the Director of 
PDS (i.e., Hogland) the authority to formulate and recommend policies, and to implement and 
enforce adopted policies and procedures, with the approval of the Mayor and City Council. See 
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R. 90. Moreover, not only did Hogland lack final policymaking authority, but he also lacked 
final decision-making authority. As noted earlier, the BTA could appeal Hogland's decisions to 
the building code committee or the City Council. See R. 142, Ex. 2 "Aff. of Christopher Burke," 
Ex. A, "Ilogland Depo.", p. 155,Ll. 9 - 18 and Ex. 46, UBC 3 105. In this case, BTA actually 
did appeal Hogland's decision to the City Council, and was successful in having that decision 
reversed. Thus, the District Court correctly determined that while Hogland had supervisory and 
decision-making authority, he lacked the necessary final policymaking authority necessary to 
impute 3 1983 liability to the City. Accordingly, the decision of the District Court should be 
affirmed. 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT HOGLAND WAS 
ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY. 
Under 5 1983 jurisprudence, "government officials performing discretionary functions, 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.  800,818 (1982). 
As an initial inquiry, the court must consider: "Taken in the light most favorable to the 
party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional 
right?" Saucier v. Katz, 533  U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If the answer is in the negative, the inquiry 
ends. Id. "On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' 
submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established." Id. To 
be "clearly established," the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable 
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Id. at 202. "If the law did not 
put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on 
qualified immunity is appropriate." Id. Moreover, "[ilf the officer's mistake as to what the law 
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requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense." Id. at 205. 
In Nation v. State, -Idaho -, 158 P3d. 953 (2007), this Court addressed the doctrine of 
qualified immunity in the context of whether IDOC employees were entitled to immunity where 
they had provided unredacted workers' compensation forms to the Ada County Sheriff in 
connection with a criminal investigation. The constitutional claim was the plaintiffs entitlement 
to "informational privacy". See 158 P3d. at 963. The Court recognized the contours of the 
constitutional right at issue were unclear, even in jurisdictions where the right to informational 
privacy had been recognized. Utilizing the most liberal interpretation of the Federal 
Constitution, the Court concluded the defendants had not violated the plaintiff's rights and were 
entitled to qualified immunity. Id. 
In this case, a similar conclusion is warranted. The constitutional right at issue is whether 
the BTA enjoyed a property right in its building permit. Absent a property right, the City was 
not requited to afford any procedural protections in connection with the issuance of the SWO or 
the expiration of the permit. The majority of courts, including the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, focus upon whether the enabling legislation gives the building official discretion to 
grant or deny the permit. if discretion exists, a property right in the permit does not arise. See 
Jocobson v. Haitnijien, 627 F2d. 177 (9" Cir. 1980); Batteson v. Geisse, supra; Creative 
Environments, Inc, v. Estabrook, supra; Gardner v. Baltimore Mayor and Cify Council, 
supra; Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach, supra; Jacobs Visconsi & Jacobs v. City of Lawrence, 
927 F2d. 11 11 (10" Cir. 1991); Vista Partners v. Counfy of Cansta Barbara, 732 F .  Supp. 1046 
(C.D. Cal 1990). In contrast, the District of Columbia recognizes a property right in the 
possession of a building permit because it is not readily revocable. See 3883 Connecticut, LLC 
v. District of Columbia, supra. The different approaches demonstrates that at the time this 
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dispute arose, the law was not clearly established. This fact entitles Hogland to qualified 
immunity. See Lum v. Jenson, 876 F2d. 1385 (9" Cir. 1986); cert. denied 493 U.S. 1057 (1990) 
(because individuals are not required to predict developments in the law, the lack of binding 
precedent in the circuit coupled with the existence of conflicting case authority from other 
jurisdictions, entitles the individual to qualified immunity). 
Alternatively, and consistent with this Court's ruling in Nation v. State, supra, if one 
accepted the approach taken by the District of Columbia, the BTA was afforded all the process it 
was entitled to receive by Mr. Hogland and the City. The BTA was allowed to appeal I-Iogland's 
decision to the City Council. See R.142, Exh. 10. After hearing the presentations of both sides, 
the Council found in favor of the BTA and reinstated the pennit. In other words, procedural due 
process was afforded and utilized. Id. There is no evidence in this record indicating Mr. 
Hogland took any actions which prevented the BTA from exercising its procedural rights. For 
that reason, the district court correctly concluded that Hogland was entitled to qualified 
immunity. 
Finally, even if one assumed a constitutional violation occurred, Mr. Hogland's actions 
must be viewed in the context of the unsettled law and the factual circumstances he faced. He is 
entitled to qualified immunity if he made a decision which, even through constitutionally 
deficient, reasonably misapprehended the law governing the circumstances he was confronted. 
See Saucier v. Katz. 533 U.S.  at 206; Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004). Here, Mr. 
Hogland was reasonable in his belief and under the circumstances which were facing him 
concerning the BTA's failure to advance the project, that the permit had expired when he issued 
the SWO. In their subsequent meetings, the BTA did nothing to disabuse Hogland of this belief. 
These facts establish that Hogland is entitled to qualified immunity. 
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E. THE STIPULATION BETWEEN THE BTA AND THE CITY CURING THE 
APPELLANT'S VIOLATIONS WAS NOT VOID.. 
BTA argues the stipulation agreement which cured its prior violations of the building 
permit and allowed construction to resume was ultravires and void. Appellant erroneously relies 
upon Black v. Young, 122 Idaho 302, 834 P2d. 304 (1992). In that case, the city imposed 
conditions upon its agreement to enact an ordinance vacating a public street. The Supreme Court 
found the ordinance invalid as the offending conditions exceeded the authority the city was 
granted through I.C. $50-311, which specifically governed the process whereby streets were 
vacated. The Court pointed out that the powers granted to local governments through the Local 
Planning Act were not applicable to the case as the ordinance in question did not involve zoning 
activities. See 122 Idaho at 308, note 3. 
In this case, the conclusions in Black v. Young are inapplicable as the actions of Boise 
City clearly involved zoning activities surrounding the regulation of building construction. The 
Local Planning Act at I.C. 567-651 l(1) authorizes governing boards, such as the Boise City 
Council, to regulate and establish standards for "...construction, recommendation, alteration, 
repair or use of buildings and structures." By virtue of I.C. 567-6503, the Act is applicable to 
municipal corporations, such as Boise City. The Idaho Building Code Act, at I.C. $39-4109(5) 
adopts the Uniform Building Code. The Act, at I.C. 539-4116 requires local governments 
enforcing building codes to utilize the codes adopted by the Act which include the UBC. 
The UBC grants the local building official, in this case Mr. Hogland, the authority and 
discretion to address structures which are regulated by the Code and which are structurally 
unsafe. See Exhibit 9 (Hogland Aff., Exh. G, Section 102). As described in Mr. Hogland's 
affidavit, due to the open construction site created by the BTA, coupled with the Appellant's 
demonstrated failure to meet thc conditions of its permit and proceed with work in a timely 
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fashion, he was faced with a situation where an open pit existed in the downtown of Boise which 
he felt created a hazard. See Exhibit 9 (Hogland Aff., 110). Under Section 102 of the UBC, 
Hogland could have abated the unsafe situation by utilizing the procedure set forth in the 
Dangerous Buildings Code. Id. Alternatively, the UBC provided: "...the building official, or 
other employee or official of this jurisdiction as designated by the governing body, may institute 
any other appropriate action to prevent, restrain, correct or abate the violation." Id. 
Here, Mr. Hogland exercised the discretion which was afforded to him by the UBC. 
Rather than choose a harsh approach, he attempted to cure the BTA's violations by entering into 
a stipulation agreement whereby work would commence, the City could receive assurances the 
stnicture was safe and that work would progress in a timely fashion. The requirement that the 
BTA provide proof it had secured financing was reasonable and prudent in light of Appellant's 
past performance which had created an open construction pit in the downtown of Boise which 
had been sitting idle for many months. Hogland was not attempting to extract a benefit for the 
City or anyone else. Instead, in light of the BTA's past performance, he was seeking assurances 
that it would have sufficient funding to undertake and finish the project. His actions were 
reasonable and consistent with Section 102 of the UBC which provided a mechanism to correct 
the BTA's existing violation and consistent with slate policy encouraging parties to use 
stipulations and agreements to settle disputes. See Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622, 151 
P3d. 818 (2007); Kohring v. Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 34 P3d. 1149 (2002). Here, the 
stipulation agreement was negotiated between BTA principles and the City. The BTA was 
represented by counsel during those negotiations. Exh. 9 (Hogland Aff., 7711-13. The 
agreement is clearly supported by consideration as the City was foregoing its right to take other 
actions to abate the BTA's violations and conversely, the BTA is receiving a benefit as the 
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dispute concerning its permit was resolved. For these reasons, the agreement is valid. 
F. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AS TO BTA'S TAKING CLAIM. 
Appellant contends it was entitled to compensation for a temporary "talting" of its 
property due to the temporary stoppage in construction. BTA's argument is flawed for three 
reasons: (1) it did not have a property right in the building permit; (2) there was no "taking" of 
the physical property for public use; and (3) the issue was not ripe. 
Both the United States and Idaho Constitutions prohibit the taking of private property for 
public use without just compensation. See U.S. CONST., amend. V; Idaho Const., Atr. I $14; 
McCuskey v. Canyon County Comm'rs, 128 Idaho 213, 215, 912 P.2d 100, 102 (1996). 
Constitutional jurisprudence has extended this protection to governmental interference with an 
owner's use or enjoyment of his private property. McCuskey, 128 Idaho at 215. However, 
"[mlere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental decisionmaking, absent 
extraordinary delay, are incidents of ownership. They cannot be considered as a 'taking' in the 
constitutional sense." Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,263 n. 9, (1980) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
In Intermountain West v. Boise City, 11 1 Idaho 878, 728 P.2d 767 (1986), this Court 
addressed the very issue of whether the revocation of building pennits and issuance of SWOs 
constituted a taking. In that case, the City annexed land and issued stop-work orders against the 
construction of apartments by the builder pending the receipt of a city building permit. The SWO 
was ignored, and the City filed suit seeking an injunction barring further construction. The City 
obtained a temporary injunction on July 30, 1975. Later, at a hearing for a permanent injunction, 
the trial court found for the builder, and the injunction was lifted. The builder sued "for the 
City's wrongful issuance of stop-work orders and a temporary injunction against Intermountain's 
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continued construction of its apartment complex". The Court rejected the claim that the City's 
issuance of stop-work orders and refusal to issue a building permit amounted to inverse 
condemnation. See Intermountain West, 11 I Idaho at 880. The Court also reasoned: 
A zoning ordinance which downgrades the economic value of 
property does not constitute a taking of property without 
compensation at least where some residual value remains in the 
property. [Citation omitted]. The circumstances in this case 
indicate the property retained residual value despite any damage 
that may have been caused by respondent's actions and, therefore, 
no cornpensable taking occurred. 
Id. See also Concrete Pipe & Prods. Of California, Znc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 
U.S. 602,645 (1993) ("mere diminution in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient 
to demonstrate a taking."). 
Similarly, in Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, supra, the court rejected a categorical rule that 
deprivation of economic use, not matter how brief, constitutes a cornpensable taking, because it 
"would apply to numerous 'normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning 
ordinances, variances, and the like,' as well as to orders temporarily prohibiting access to crime 
scenes, businesses that violate health codes, fire-damaged buildings, or other areas that we 
cannot now foresee." Id., 535 U S .  at 334-35 (citation omitted). "A rule that required 
compensation for every delay in the use of property would render routine government processes 
prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty decisionmaking." Id. at 335. See also Sunrise Corp. 
v. City of Myrtle Beach, 420 F.3d 322, 330 (4th Cir. 2005) ("As a general rule, a delay in 
obtaining a building permit is not a taking but a non-cornpensable incident of ownership."). 
The court in Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council also noted that strict ripeness must be 
recognized in takings cases: i.e., "a landowner may not establish a taking before a land-use 
authority has the opportunity, using its own reasonable procedures, to decide and explain the 
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reach of a challenged regulation." Id. at 339. 
In this case, there was a substantial government interest in issuing a stop-work order-the 
enforcement of the UBC, and the health and safety concerns regarding the project. The impact on 
the BTA was minimal-in fact, BTA has not proffered any evidence qfaperaunenf loss ofvalue 
of the property. The Document Dump reveals that BTA's allegations of harm in obtaining 
financing, even if relevant, are false. There is no evidence of a taking. This is a case where the 
alleged "taking" was of a short duration during a process of governmental decision making. In 
short, there was no constitutioliai taking. The District Court was correct in granting summary 
judgment. 
G. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE BTA'S STATE TORT 
CLAIMS. 
BTA claims that the District Court erred in dismissing his claims against Hogland for 
"intentional interference with contract" and "intentional interference with prospective economic 
gain." The district court was correct because Respondents are immunized by the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act (ITCA). In determining whether a governmental entity is entitled to immunity under 
the ITCA, the trial court must go through three steps. Coonse v. Boise Sch. Dist., 132 Idaho 
803, 805, 979 P.2d 1161, 1163 (1999). First, the court must determine whether the plaintiffs 
allegations and supporting record generally state a cause of action for which a private person or 
entity would he liable for money damages under the laws of the state of Idaho. Id. Second, if 
there is a cause of action, the court must then determine whether an exception to liability under 
the ITCA shields the defendant's misconduct from liability. Id. Finally, if no exception to 
liability applies, the Court must be determined if the merits of the claim as presented for 
consideration on the motion for summary judgment entitle the moving party to dismissal. 
1. Whether the Aa~ellant Generally States a Cause of Action. 
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Idaho recognizes a cause of action for intentional interference with contract. See Bybee v. 
Isaac, - Idaho -, 178 P.3d 616, 624 (2008). Idaho does not recognize a cause of action for 
intentional interference with economic gain, but does recognize a cause of action for intentional 
interference with a potential economic advantage. See Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley 
Foods, 121 Idaho 266,286,824 P.2d 841,861 (1991). 
2. Horrland is Shielded from Liability Der Idaho Code 8 6-904(3). 
Idaho Code F) 6-904 provides that "[a] governmental entity and its employees while 
acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent 
shall not be liable for any claim which . .. arises out o f . .  . interference with contract rights." I.C. 
5 6-904(3). This immunity would, under the facts of this case, apply to the interference with 
prospective economic advantage claims. There is no allegation or evidence that Hogland acted 
outside the course and scope of his employment. Thus, to defeat the immunities, BTA must show 
that the defendants acted with malice or criminal intent. 
(i) There Is No Evidence of Malice. 
For purposes of the ITCA, "malice" means "the intentional commission of a wrongful or 
unlawful act, without legal justification or excuse and with ill will, whether or not injuxy was 
intended. Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 188,731 P.2d 171, 183 (1986) (italics in 
original). BTA has failed to provide any evidence of "ill will." In fact, the only evidence 
presented to the District Court indicated that Hogland issued the November SWO only becawe 
of a mistake as to whether work had been performed in the preceding 180 days-an error 
compounded by BTA's failure to timely inform Hogland of the date of the last work. The 
subsequent suspension of the Permit was in accordance with the Stipulation. Thus, there is no 
showing that Hogland at any time attempted to act outside what was permitted under the law, or 
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that he was motivated by "ill will." 
Ironically, BTA contends there was "ill will," in part, because Hogland should have 
known that if the Permit had expired, he could not extend the permit period. See Appellant's 
Brief at 3 9 , l  (a). This argument ignores Hogland's earlier decision to grant an extension when 
the permit expired. It also ignores the fact Hogland chose to extend the permit under the 
stipulation agreement when he could have treated the open construction site as a public nuisance 
and abated the condition using the Dangerous Building Code. These are not the acts of someone 
with "ill will" towards the BTA. 
BTA's other arguments to support "ill will" only illustrate that BTA lacked the 
wherewithal to complete its project. For instance, BTA complains that until the Boise Tower 
project, Iiogland had never required review or approval of a loan commitment or closing of a 
construction loan as a condition of extending a building permit. This glosses over the fact that 
Hogland had never been presented with a developer digging a huge hole in the middle of 
downtown, not doing any work for nearly 6 months while posing a credible risk to the integrity 
of the surrounding land and structures, and lacking the financial means to move the project 
forward. This is not evidence of ill will contemplated by the ITCA. It reveals a city employee 
who was attempting to help BTA through its problems and, at the same time, protect the health 
and safety of the public. Simply stated, Hogland was attempting to protect the public from a 
scenario where BTA would construct a few floors, run out of money, and then abandon the 
project. His desire to obtain assurances that BTA had the financial resources for this project was 
prudent in light of the history of the project up to that time. 
(ii) There is No Evidence of Criminal Intent. 
Contrary to the Appellant's briefing, "criminal intent" was not discussed by the 
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Anderson court; in fact, the court specifically noted that "criminal intent" had not been alleged. 
Anderson, 112 Idaho at 187. However, in Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 
(1986), the Court noted that "[tlhe 'criminal intent' provision 'is satisfied if it is shown that the 
defendant knowingly performed the proscribed acts ...." Id., 110 Idaho at 470 (quoting State v. 
Gowin, 97 Idaho 766, 767-68, 554 P.2d 944, 945-46 (1976)). The court also quoted with 
approval a Utah case stating: "A person acts with intent when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or to cause the result." Id (quoting State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 
856, 858 (Utah 1981)). Thus, "criminal intent" requires "specific intent to commit a crime" on 
the part of the individual. See State v. Gowin, 97 Idaho at 767-68 (explaining "specific intent"). 
See also Doe v. Durfschi, supra (noting that the element was satisfied because the employee had 
confessed to committing the crimes). There is no allegation or evidence that Hogland committed 
a crime, or did so knowingly or with specific intent. Hogland is entitle to immunity under Idaho 
Code § 6-904(3). 
3. Hogland is Shielded from Liability Per Idaho Code 6 6-904B(3). 
The ITCA also provides that "[a] governmental entity and its employees while acting 
within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent and 
without gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct . . . shall not he liable for any 
claim which .. . [alrises out of the ... suspension or revocation of ... a permit ...." I.C. $ 6- 
904B(3). Either "malice or criminal intent" or "reckless, willful and wanton conduct" must be 
established in order to defeat immunity." Hunter v. Dep't of Corrections, 138 Idaho 44, 47, 57 
P.3d 755,758 (2002). As discussed above, malice and criminal intent are absent. Thus, the issue 
is whether the record contains evidence of "reckless, willful and wanton" conduct. 
For purposes of the ITCA, "reckless, willful and wanton" is "present only when a person 
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intentionally and knowingly does or fails to do an act creating an unreasonable risk of harm to 
another and which involves a high degree of probability that such harm will result." I.C. 6- 
904C. The key element is knowledge, which implies foreseeability. Hunter, 138 Idaho at 49. For 
purposes of the ITCA, the requisite foreseeability is more than the mere possibility of harm. 
Rather, "[tlhe specific harm . . . must be manifest or ostensible, and highly likely to occur." Id. 
(quoting Harris v. State Dep't of Health and Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,299, 847 P.2d 1156, 1160 
(1 992)) (emphasis added). 
Appellant's argument is that the requisite foreseeabilty is established by (i) Hogland's 
knowledge of the construction contract with Mortenson; and (ii) that Hogland knew BTA was 
working with Marshall Investment Group trying to obtain a loan to finance construction of the 
Project. See Appellant's Brief at 41. The first point is irrelevant because it was not pled in the 
Complaint. See Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172,176,75 P.3d 733,737 
(2003) ("No dispute of fact is 'material,' however, unless it relates to an issue that is disclosed by 
the pleadings."). The second point does not demonstrate knowledge of the specific harm; i.e., 
that if a SWO was issued or the Permit suspended, Marshall would withdraw its offer to finance 
the construction. In fact, there is no evidence that Hogland knew any of the details of BTA's 
negotiations with Marshall or the status of those negotiations. Contrary to BTA's arguments the 
materials produced through the Document Dump proves the SWO and any subsequent dispute 
concerning the pern~it had no impact on Appellant's efforts to get financing. 
4. Irrespective of the ITCA, Nogland Was Entitled to Summary Judgment. 
In its complaint, BTA alleged that Hogland interfered with its contracts with prospective 
buyers of condominium units by revoking the BTA's building permit. See R. at 19, "Complaint," 
17 41-43. The elements of tortious interference with contract are: (1) the existence of a contract; 
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(2) knowledge of the contract on the part of the defendant; (3) intentional interference causing a 
breach of the contract; and (4) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the breach. Bybee v. Isaac, - 
Idaho -, 178 P.3d 616,624 (2008). 
As noted, BTA had to show knowledge of the contract on the part of the defendant. BTA 
further had to show that the alleged interference caused a breach of contract. In response to the 
summary judgment motion by Respondents, BTA submitted the Affidavit of Frederick Peterson 
that stated: "[Tlhe revocation of the building permit, and the adverse publicity surrounding it, led 
to cancellation of a number of BTA's presale condominium agreements. ..." See R. 142, Ex. 3, 
"Affidavit of Fredrick Peterson," 7 19. Missing is any evidence that any of the persons canceling 
the presale condominium agreements breached those agreements or if a breach occurred, were 
motivated by the actions of the defendants. If perspective tenants simply chose to void the 
contracts by exercising their rights under the agreement that development cannot be blamed upon 
the Defendant. Even if it could, their decisions lack any evidence that the prospective tenants 
made their decisions because of the SWO. 
BTA also had to show that the interference was intentional. Nowhere does BTA present 
evidence of intent; nor is the evidence such to permit an inference of intent. Rather, the evidence 
suggests that, at best, Hogland made an honest mistake concerning whether work had been 
performed within 180 days prior to the November 2002 SWO. The later suspension of the Permit 
was fully permissible under the terms of the Stipulation. Rhere is also no evidence that Hogland 
was actually aware of any particular contractual arrangement; BTA has only offered a 
conclusory statement that Hogland was aware that there had been presales of condominiums. 
Finally, there is a complete lack of evidence showing damage due to the alleged breach of the 
presale agreements; that is, while BTA claims it lost financing due the loss of the pre-sales of 
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condominiums, the Document Dump paints a very different picture of BTA simply being 
unwilling to work with potential financiers. 
BTA also alleged that Hogland interfered with BTA's prospective economic relations and 
its economic expectancy in revenues from a completed Boise Tower Project. See R. 20, 
"Complaint," 7 49. The elements of the tort of intentional interference with a prospective 
economic advantage are: (1) the existence of a valid economic expectancy; (2) knowledge of the 
expectancy on the part of the interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing termination of the 
expectancy; (4) the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the 
interference itself (i.e., that the defendant interfered for an improper purpose or improper means) 
and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted. Highland Enters. 
K Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 338, 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999). In showing that the interference was 
wrongful, plaintiff must show not only that the defendant interfered with his business 
relationship, but also that the defendant had a duty of non-interference. Idaho First Nat'l Bank 
v. Bliss Valley Foods, 12 1 Idaho 266,286,824 P.2d 841, 861 (1 991). 
As above, there is no evidence of intent, that Hogland had specific knowledge of the 
expectancy as to any specific financier, that any interference occurred or was wrongful, or that 
the damage allegedly suffered was caused by the temporary suspension of the Permit. Thus, 
summary judgment was appropriate. 
H. RESPONDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S PEES BOTH BELOW 
AND ON APPEAL. 
Following the grant of summary judgment and entry of judgment, Respondents moved 
for costs and fees as the prevailing party under Idaho Rule Of civil Procedure 54(E)(I), 42 
U.S.C. $ 1988, and Idaho Code $$ 6-918A and 12-1 17. The District Court erred by not granting 
attorney's fees to Respondents 
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42 U.S.C. 5 1988 provides that in any action or proceeding to enforce civil rights statutes, 
including 5 1983, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable 
attorney's fee as part of the costs.. .." This Court has noted that prevailing defendants are entitled 
to attorney fees under 5 1988 "only where the action is 'unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or 
vexatious."' Nation V. State, -Idaho -, 158 P.3d 953, 969 (2007). This Court has, in the past, 
found that attorney's fees must be awarded if the moving party meets the applicable 
requirements. See, e.g., Farner v. Idaho Falls Sch. Dist. No. 91, 135 Idaho 337, 342, 17 P.3d 
28 1,286 (2000); Lowder v. Minidoka County Joint Sch. Dist. No. 331, 132 Idaho 834,841,979 
P.2d 1 192, 1 199 (1999). 
Idaho Code 5 6-918A provides for the award of fees to the governmental entity or its 
employee where it is shown, "by clear and convincing evidence, that the party against whom or 
which such award is sought was guilty of bad faith in the commencement, conduct, maintenance 
or defense of the action." Idaho Code 5 12-117 permits the award of attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party if the court determines the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. See Karr v. Bermeosolo, 142 Idaho 444,449, 129 P.3d 88, 
93 (2005). 
As more fully set out in Respondents' Statement of Facts, supra, some 2 % years after 
suit was filed, and after it was too late to submit the evidence to the District Court in support of 
summary judgment, Appellant produced documents (the "Document Dump") showing that it 
continued negotiating for financing months after the City Council upheld BTA's Permit. 
Specifically, the Document Dump revealed that Marshall Investment Group continued financing 
efforts until at least l l weeks a$er revocation and at least 21 days aftev the April 8, 2003, 
reinstatement of the permit; and on better terms to BTA. The Document Dump also revealed at 
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least three other potential financers-Owens Investment Fund ("Owens"), Commercial Mortgage 
Investment Company ("CMI"), and WS&O, Ltd ("WS&O)-who were willing to finance the 
project after the conclusion of the dispute with the City over the Permit. Marshall, Owens, CMI 
and WS&O all agreed to lend BTA the requisite financing without regard to the state of the 
building permit. See also Part III(A)(4), supra (describing BTA's negotiation with potential 
financers after the conclusion of the dispute with the City). 
On March 5, 2003, BTA (using the same lawyers) filed a lawsuit in federal district court 
against lender Washington Capital Management, et. al. ("WCM"). On September 30,2005, in an 
affidavit filed in federal court, Peterson testified "As a result of WCM's refusal to close the 
construction loan on the terms of the Loan Commitment, the Project was never built and BTA 
suffered damages in excess of $19 million .... BTA, to date, has been unable to procure 
alternative financing." See R. 143, Ex. 8, Aff. of Counsel, Ex. B, 17 6-7. This is the exact claim 
made against the City and Hogland. 
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that as of November 2, 2004-the date this suit was 
filed-Appellant not only knew that the dispute concerning the Building Permit had not 
interfered with its financing, but had already sued another entity alleging the same injury. 
Moreover, 1 % years prior to the time the City filed its motion for summary judgment, 
Peterson-the managing member of BTA-had provided affidavit testimony that another 
entity-Washington Capital Management-was responsible for BTA's inability to obtain 
financing. Issues of judicial estoppel aside, this clearly demonstrates that BTA pursued its suit 
against Respondents knowing and believing that another entity was responsible for its damages. 
In short, it is clear that BTA filed and pursued this suit frivolously, unreasonably, and without 
foundation or merit. As such, Respondents are entitled to attorney's fees, and the Court should 
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reverse the District Court's decision denying said fees and remand for determination of the 
appropriate amount. 
Inasmuch as the initial suit was brought and maintained frivolously, unreasonably, and 
without foundation or merit, Appellant has likewise brought the instant appeal frivolously, 
unreasonably, and without foundation or merit. Accordingly, Respondents are entitled to 
attorney's fees on appeal. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the District Court's Decision and Order on Cross Motions 
for Summary Judgment should be affirmed. Additionally, the District Court's Order denying the 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant's attorney fees should be reversed. 
DATED this 16th day of May, 2008. 
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